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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM B. HARRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

GENAVE H. TANNER, GRACE H.
McPHIE, BANNIE H-. DURFEE ,
and GRANT H. HARRIS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents, )
and

JAMES H. HARRIS,
Plaintiff in Intervention-Respondent,
vs.

WILLIAM B. HARRIS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court
Case No. 16810

Defendant in Intervention-Appellant.
~---~~~~~---~---~---------~)

In the Matter of the Estate
of

JAMES HENRY HARRIS, also
known as JAMES H. HARRIS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Deceased.
---------~~~---~---~~~~~)
)
)
WILLIAM B. HARRIS,

)
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
HARRIS McPHIE, et a_l,
)
Defendants-Respondents. ))

Plaintiff-Appellant

GRACE

_________________________________
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District
in and for Tooele County
Honorable David K. Winder, District Judge

SKEEN AND SKEEN
By E. J. SKEEN
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

HUNT, LAREW & KINATEDER
by HOLLIS S. HUNT
345 South State Street, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
There is an apparent misapprehension indicated in
the respondent's brief as to the nature of the proceedings
before Judge Winder.

It is stated in their statement of

facts that Judge Winder conducted a trial of issues
reserved by Judge Croft.

No issues were reserved.

The hear-

ing before Judge Winder was on motions to enforce Judge
Croft's judgments and to designate items of property which
are partnership property.

ARGUMENT
In response to the appellant's argument under
Point I in the

appellant~s

brief that the court erred in

declaring and determining that the assets of the HarrisHarris partnership, including the proceeds from the HarrisFidler partnership, have been fully and completely designated
and distributed and that th.ere has been a winding up of the
affairs of the Harris-Harris partnership, the respondents
argue:
1.

Judge Croft'· s 1977 judgment is res

judicata as to the determination of the assets
held and to be accounted for in the HarrisHarris partnership.

(Res. br. pp. 6, 7.)
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2.

The funds in the bank accounts were to be

accounted for in the probate estate and" .... Judge
Croft did not include the funds held at any time in
bank accounts as partnership assets .... " (Res. hr. p. 8.
3.

Such accounting as was required by Judge

Croft's decision was made at the trial before Judge
Winder.
4.

(Res. br. p. 9.)
The accounting as demanded by the appellant

is premature.

(Res. br. 9, 10.)

These points will be discussed in the order stated.
POINT l
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA

rs

NOT APPLICABLE

We quote from the respondent's brief, page 8:
" .... This case presents a circumstance where
the same parties are involved, the same causes of
action, issues that were litigated in a prior action
and in which judgment thereon was rendered and the
Appellant should not be allowed to raise issues
which were or should have been raised in the former
action. Ri~h~~ds V. Hbd~bn, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.
2d 1044 (Utah .19 71) . Judge Winder properly rejected
evidence regarding matters that were or should have
been raised in the earlier action before Judge Croft.
This includes evidence regarding assets already
mentioned herein and those other assets as mentioned
in Appellant's Brief at pp. 8-9."
Th.ere is no res judicata question involved.
consolidated cases are the only cases before the court.

The two
The

references to a "prior action", the "former action" and "the
earlier action" are all erroneous and misleading.

Judge Croft's

memorandum decision was stipulated to be the findings of fact
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and conclusions of law in these cases.

The formal judgment was

signed by Judge Croft on December 14, 1977, was made and
entered in the same adversary cases as those before Judge Winder.
Judge Croft's judgment was final and no appeal was taken therefrom.

It decided all issues before the court in the consoli-

dated adversary cases, but did not designate with particularity
the items which were determined to be partnership property and
which were retained or s·old as follows:
1.

Horses and sheep s.old by the temporary

administrator.
2.

All property that came to James and

William from Harris-Fidler upon its dissolution,
including money, sheep, other personal property,
and the proceeds from the sale of partnership
property not included in partnership income tax
returns of the partners for 1972, 1973, and 1974.
3.

Money in th.e bank accounts of James H.

Harris and his estate which were unidentified and
unaccounted for by the Personal Representatives.
The appellant's brief, pages 9, 14, 15, and 16>
lists specified items of partnership property which were sold
by the personal represe.ntatives of James' Estate.

Mr. Harris

died in 19.75» so obviously these items were not covered by the
1972 - 1974 income tax return~

The respondent's attemnt to
.i.

dispose of the question as to the identity of partnership
property by vague and incomprehensible arguments about res
judicata, discussed above, and the accounting by Judge Winder.
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It is also argued that the accounting as demanded is premature.
The accounting arguments will be discussed under the next
heading.
POINT II.
THE RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING ACCOUNTING
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
As indicated in the appellant's opening brief, the
motion filed on July 20, 1978, to enforce Judge Croft's 1977
judgment by requiring an accounting by the Personal Representatives of James' Estate for partnership property covered the
following:
1.

Money received by James upon the Harris-

Fidler dissolution.
2.

All items of livestock and livestock

equipment in their possession.
3.

All Harris-Harris partnership property

sold by James and by his estate.
4.

Money on deposit in James' and Estate bank

accounts and amounts withdrawn.

(App. br. pp. 6, 7 .)

The respondents file.cl a list of i terns of partnership
property in their possessicm and listed the following items of
partnership property which were sold:
a.

A new sheep camp, appraised value $2,200.00.

b.

Miscellaneous horses and sheep sold through

temporary administrators.
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Judge Winder included the sheep camp in his computation of the amount owed by William to the estate, but ignored
miscellaneous horses and sheep which the respondents admitted
in writing were partnership property.
The total sales price was $1,305.53.

(R. 8984 pp. 132 - 130)
See probate file p. 139.

This was obviously error.
The probate file, p. 139, lists items of part?ership
property in addition to sheep-and horses which were sold after
the death of James, such as:
Commodity Credit wool settlement

$

Production Credit Ass'n shares sale

265.00

Connnodity Credit Corporation
wool incentive payment
Total

266.40

2,206.89
$2,738.29

The omission of these items from an accounting was error.
It i:s clearly the intent of the 1977 judgment that
there should oe an accounting between the partners on an equal
basis of partners·hip assets listed in the judgment in sub-paragraphs a, b, c, and d.

CR. 8326_, p. 67A)

The judgment appealed

from relates only to sub-paragraphs a, b, and d, but does not
dispose of s.ub-paragrapb. c.

(R. 8984, pp. 165 - 161)

The. 19.77 judgment deals with the money contained in
the James: H, Harris bank accounts as testified to by Genave H.
Tanner by directing that they be accounted for in the probate
estate.

(R. 8326, p. 64)

The error of the trial court in

disposing of this issue is discussed under the next heading.
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT WILLIAM,
AS A PARTNER, SHALL HAVE NO CLAIM AGAINST
THE ESTATE OF JAMES H. HARRIS
In response to the appellant's argument on this
point, the respondents state that William filed a "Withdrawal
of Objections and Waiver of Interest" which should be dispositive of the matter.

(Res. br. p. 11)

the probate file, pp. 207, 206.

Reference is made to

IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THE

DOCUMENT REFERRED TO IS NOT SIGNED.
Th.ere is in the file a withdrawal of objections to
probate of the will.

(Probate - p. 123)

to waiver of any interest in the estate.

It makes no reference
The effect of the

document is to withdraw the objections to the admission of the
will to probate.

It cannot be construed as a withdrawal of

William's claim as an heir or as a claimant to property which
was inventoried as estate property.

The Croft judgment declares

in paragraph 8 (R. 8326, p. 64) th.at William owned one half of
the partnership property, and that his one-half was not subject
to probate in James' estate.

The reference to the unsigned

"Withdrawal of Objections and Waiver of Interest" appears to be
a deliberate effort to mislead this Court.
The respondent further argues that if the waiver is
not dtspositive of the issue, the determination that William
has no claim against the estate "is simply a restatement of the
other provisions of the judgment determining interests of the
parties and winding up the affairs".

It is stated further that

" .... it is cons is tent with the Court having received the accountSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
ing
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funds were not partnership property."
This argument misstates the facts.

(Res. br. pp. 11, 12)

The judgment appealed

from is not based on findings that the money that was on
deposit in James' name or taken from his bank accounts
immediately prior to his death was not partnership money.
Judge Winder made no such findings.

(R. 8984 pp. 160-152)

The judgment of the court after the hearing on
the motion to enforce was based upon findings that the only
matters to be tried and determined were the values and proper
division of the items of farm machinery, trucks, and equipment
listed in Judge Croft's judgment and property depreciated out.
(Tr. 6-19-79, pp. 116 - 120)

The court, in its oral remarks

at the conclusion of the hearing on October 29, 1979, stated:
"And I'll be the first to acknowledge that
maybe what I did at the end of the June 19 - 20
hearing may seem a little arbitrary, but I think
th.ere '·s such a great advantage to laying this
matter to rest, and I tried to do it as fairly
as I could . (Tr . 10 - 2 9 - 79 - p . 18) "
The respondents have completely ignored the argument
in appellant's brief that in the hearing on the motion to en. force the jud·gment (1) that the probate proceeding had not been
consolidated for trial; (2) that the Croft judgment deferred
action in the probate proceeding until after the determination
of the consolida.ted adversary, cases; (3) that the court had no
jurisdiction of William for the determination of the issues set
out in the Executrices petition as discussed on page 19 of Judge
Croft '·s Memorandum decision; (4) that since the entry of the
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1977 judgment, no action had been taken to give the court
jurisdiction of William in the probate proceeding; (5)
William's property rights in the partnership money, the HarrisFidler assets, the sheep and horses cannot be disposed of in
the consolidated cases as such claims were not asserted in
the pleadings in either case; (6) the probate proceeding must
be permitted to proceed in accordance with the statutes; (7)
an accounting must be filed in the probate and (8) William's
right to object and to challenge efforts to distribute to the
heirs his sheep, horses, hay and money cannot be denied except
by a court with jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
William's person.
The judgment appealed from on the motion to enforce
ignored the clear and controlling direction in the 1977 judgment that an accounting be filed in the probate proceeding.
(R. 8326 - p. 64)

William would have an opportunity to object

and to raise an issue as to the ownership of the money and
property which he claimed as a partner and individually.

The

judgment on the motion, if sustained, would overturn the final
1977 judgment in the particulars discussed above.
The denial of William's right as a partner to assert
his claims against the estate was without jurisdiction, was
contrary to the plain provisions of the 1977 judgment, was
without support of pleadings and evidence, and was contrary
to law.
-8-
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CONCLUSION
The judgment on appeal was based upon an erroneous
interpretation of the findings and of the judgment sought to
be enforced.

The trial court arbitrarily limited the issues

to the determination of the divt:sion
of the partnership property.

and value of only a part

Issues regarding an accounting

for partnership money, sh.eep, horses, and other i terns belonging to the partnership were excluded.

The adjudication of

the winding up of partnership affairs without an accounting
by the respondents was contrary to the evidence and the law.

The judgment that William, as a partner, had no
claim against the estate in the probate proceeding was
contrary to the controlling 1977 judgment, was without jurisdiction) and was entered in a proceeding which had not been
consolidated for trial and hearing.
The judgment should be reversed and the consolidated cases should be remanded with direction to the trial
court to hear such evidence as may be necessary to enforce
and carry out the 1977 judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN AND SKEEN

r.--J. SKE
Attorney or Plaintiff-Anpellant
1
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed to the attorneys of the
defendants-respondents, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Hollis S. Hunt
Melvin G. Larew, Jr.

HUNT, LAREW & KINATEDER
345 South State Street
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

on this 7th day of November, 1980.
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